Abstract. Recently, we showed how to strengthen block ciphers by decorrelation techniques. In particular, we proposed two practical block ciphers, one based on the GF(2 n )-arithmetics, the other based on the x mod p mod 2 n primitive with a prime p = 2 n (1 + δ). In this paper we show how to achieve similar decorrelation with a prime p = 2 n (1 − δ). For this we have to change the choice of the norm in the decorrelation theory and replace the L∞ norm by the L2 norm. We propose a new practical block cipher which is provably resistant against differential and linear cryptanalysis.
Secondly, we recall the definition of two matrix norms: the L ∞ -associated norm denoted |||.||| ∞ , and the L 2 -norm denoted ||.|| 2 .
Definition 2. Given a matrix A, we define
where the sums run over all the (x, y)-entries of the matrix A. 3 Finally, here is the definition of the general d-wise decorrelation distance between two random functions. 4 We consider block ciphers on a message-block space M with a key represented by a random variable K as a random permutation C K defined by K over M. Since the subscript K is useless in our context we omit it and consider the random variable C as a random permutation with a given distribution. Ideally, we consider the Perfect Cipher C * for which the distribution of C * is uniform over the set of the permutations over M. .
Definition 3 ([13]). Given two random functions F and G from a given set A to a given set B, an integer d and a matrix norm ||.|| over the vector space R

We are interested in the decorrelation bias ||[C]
We recall that |||.||| ∞ and ||.|| 2 are matrix norms (i.e. that the norm of any matrix-product A × B is at most the product of the norms of A and B) which makes the decorrelation bias a friendly measurement as shown by the following Lemma. 3 The strange |||.|||∞ notation used in [13] comes from the fact that this norm is associated to the usual ||.||∞ norm over the vectors defined by ||V ||∞ = max 
Those properties come from the easy facts [ (see Feistel [4] ).
To illustrate the problem, we stress out that perfect decorrelation (i.e. decorrelation bias of zero) is achievable on a finite field (no matter which norm we take). For instance, a random (d − 1)-degreed polynomial with a uniform distribution is a perfectly d-wise decorrelated function. A random affine permutation with a uniform distribution is a perfectly pairwise decorrelated permutation. (Perfect decorrelation of higher degree is much more complicated.) Finite field arithmetic is however cumbersome in software for the traditional characteristic two. This is why we studied decorrelation biases.
Previous Security Results
Decorrelation enables to quantify the security of imperfectly decorrelated ciphers. Here we consider the security in the Luby-Rackoff model [6] . We consider opponents as Turing machines which have a limited access to an encryption oracle device and whose aim is to distinguish whether the device implements a given practical cipher C 1 = C or a given cipher C 2 which is usually C 2 = C * . When fed with an oracle c, the Turing machine T c returns either 0 or 1. If we want to distinguish a random cipher C from C * , we let p (resp. p * ) denote Pr[T C = 1] (resp. Pr[T C * = 1]) where the probability is over the distribution of the random tape of T and the distribution of the cipher. We say the attack is successful if |p − p * | is large. On the other hand, we say that the cipher C resists against the attack if we have |p − p * | ≤ for some small . This model is quite powerful, because if we prove that a cipher C cannot be distinguished from the Perfect Cipher C * , then any attempt to decrypt a ciphertext provided by C will also be applicable to the cipher C * for which we know the security. (For more motivation on this security model, see Luby-Rackoff [6] .)
Inspired by Biham and Shamir's attack [2] we call differential distinguisher with the (fixed) characteristic (a, b) and complexity n the following algorithm:
Input: a cipher c, a complexity n, a characteristic (a, b)
1. for i from 1 to n do (a) pick uniformly a random X and query for c(X) and c(X ⊕ a)
Similarly, inspired by Matsui's attack [7] we call linear distinguisher with the characteristic (a, b) and complexity n the following algorithm: Input: a cipher c, a complexity n, a characteristic (a, b), a set A 1. initialize the counter value t to zero 2. for i from 1 to n do (a) pick a random X with a uniform distribution and query for c(X)
Both linear and differential distinguishers are particular cases of iterative distinguisher attacks (see [14] ). 
Theorem 5 ([14]). Let
This theorem means that C is immune against any differential or linear dis-
In this paper, we show we can obtain similar results with the L 2 -decorrelation and that we can use them for an efficient real-life cipher.
Security by L 2 -Decorrelation
It is well known that differential and linear cryptanalysis with characteristic (a, b) respectively depend on the following measurements. If C is a random cipher on Z m 2 where ⊕ denotes the group operation (the bitwise XOR) and · denotes the dot product (the parity of the bitwise and), we denote 5 For differential and linear cryptanalysis, we assume that the message space M is Z m 2 so that the addition + is the bitwise exclusive or and the dot product · is the parity of the bitwise and.
where x = (x 1 , x 2 ) and y = (y 1 , y 2 ), and X is uniformly distributed. 6 In [14] , Theorem 5 comes from the upper bounds
The same inequalities hold with the L 2 norm. (These are the consequence of Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality.) We can thus adapt Theorem 5 with the L 2 bounds without any more argument.
Theorem 6. Theorem 5 remains valid if we replace |||.||| ∞ norm by the ||.|| 2 norm.
This means that if = ||[C]
, the complexity of any basic differential or linear cryptanalysis is close to 2 m , thus no more efficient than exhaustive search.
In the following sections we show how to construct a practical cipher with a relatively small
For this we first study how to bound the decorrelation L 2 -bias of a Feistel Cipher from the decorrelation of its round functions. Then we construct round functions with relatively small decorrelation L 2 -bias and a corresponding dedicated cipher.
L 2 -Decorrelation of Feistel Ciphers
Here we show how to measure the decorrelation L 2 -bias of a Feistel cipher from the decorrelation of its round functions. We first study the case of a 2-round Feistel Cipher. 
Lemma 7. Let M 0 be a group and let
where P d is the number of partitions of {1, . . ., d}.
is an important point. In the following, we let (t, u, v, w) denote this family. Let us write the previous equation
Let ∆ Pr denotes Pr F − Pr F * with obvious notations. We have
Now we have
We note that
(and a similar property for Pr 2 ), thus we have
For any partition
We have
We have M k u-terms for which the probability is not zero. Namely it is 1/M k . The number of t-terms which correspond to this partition is
which is less than P d .
In order to measure the decorrelation distance between a 2-round Feistel Cipher and the Perfect Cipher, we thus have to study the case of a truly random 2-round Feistel Cipher. 
Proof. With obvious notations we have
||[Ψ (F * 1 , F * 2 )] d − [C * ] d || 2 2 = x,y Pr Ψ (F * 1 ,F * 2 ) − Pr C * 2 [x → y].
The sums Pr
We observe it by fixing the partition associated to x and making the sum over all ys.) For the remaining sum, we use same ideas as in the previous proof:
Lemma 8 may look useless because the decorrelation bias of is greater than one (so we cannot consider product cipher and get efficient bounds). We can however use it to study the case of a 4-round Feistel Cipher. From Lemma 7 and Lemma 8 and from Equation (5) we obtain the following Lemma in a straightforward way. 
It thus remains to study the decorrelation distance between a truly random 4-round Feistel Cipher and the Perfect Cipher: once we know that
we obtain from Equation (3) that
Unfortunately, the problem of obtaining a general result on the d-wise decorrelation of a truly random 4-round Feistel Cipher is still open. 7 In the next section we propose a construction in the d = 2 case for which we can evaluate the decorrelation.
A Dedicated Construction
In a general finite field GF(q), an obvious way to construct pairwise decorrelated functions (resp. permutations) consists of taking
where (a, b) is a random pair uniformly distributed in GF(q) 2 (resp. GF(q) * × GF(q)). Unfortunately, the traditional message space Z m 2 requires that we use finite fields of characteristic two. If we aim to implement a cipher in software on a modern microprocessor, it looks cumbersome to implement a poor characteristictwo multiplication since there already is a built-in integer multiplication. For this reason we can think of the 
Proof. We let N = 2 m 2 . We want to upper bound the sum We have a + b = δN , a + c = δN and a
Since we have 0 ≤ a ≤ δN , we have
The x 1 ≡ x 2 case is split into four cases which depend on x 1 and x 2 . The last case is y 1 ≥ p or y 2 ≥ p for which [F ] We can now upper bound the whole sum. We obtain that the decorrelation
which is less than 8δ when δ ≤ 1/14. 
Each case requires a dedicated study.
We 2 ). To prove the matrix relations, we let x denote the input of C, y denote the output of the first two rounds and z denote the output. We have
For instance, transition from case 2 (z With this result we can compute the pairwise decorrelation bias of C. We have
and n i is the number of (x, y) pairs in case i. We obtain
For r = 2 (four rounds), this is less than 2N −2 + 4N −3 .
We can now define the PEANUT97 Cipher construction. It consists of a (m, 4r, 2, p)-PEANUT Cipher, i.e. a 4r-round Feistel Cipher on m-bit message blocks which is characterized by some prime p ≤ 2 m 2 . Each round function of the cipher must be with the form
and g i is a (possibly independently keyed) permutation on the 44 . This PEANUT97 construction has been tested on a Pentium in assembly code. A 28-round 64-bit encryption required less than 790 clock cycles, which yields an encryption rate of 23Mbps working at 300MHz. The table below compares it with the PEANUT98 construction, for which the |||.||| ∞ -decorrelation theory enables to decrease the number of rounds (see [13] ) and the DFC AES candidate which is a PEANUT98 128-bit block cipher (see [5] ). All ciphers have similar security against differential and linear cryptanalysis. We remark that one PEANUT97 is much faster than the other rounds, so PEANUT97 may be faster than PEANUT98 if we can get tighter bounds in order to decrease the number of rounds. When used at the input of Feistel Ciphers, this primitive enables to protect it against differential and linear cryptanalysis. For 64-bit message block, it however requires at least 28 rounds.
Some extensions of the |||.||| ∞ -decorrelation results to the L 2 -decorrelation is still open: it is not clear how to state results with higher degrees of decorrelation (d > 2) and how to prove the security of decorrelated ciphers against general iterated attacks as in [14] .
